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ABSTRACT This article proposes a critical reading of market discipline and its limitations as 
a mechanism in European economic governance. Consistent with neoliberal beliefs about 
market-based governance, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is premised on the 
functioning of the government bond market as a fiscal-policy discipliner. However, the 
operation of market discipline requires that neither governments nor their private creditors can 
rely on an authority to bail them out. It therefore precludes the kinds of intervention by 
Eurozone’s supranational institutions witnessed during the euro crisis. In the post-crisis 
context, efforts to strengthen market discipline continue to be frustrated by the growing reliance 
of financial institutions on government bond markets as well as the European Central Bank’s 
(ECB) active participation in those markets. Having undermined the credibility of the market 
as an autonomous and apolitical mechanism of discipline, European economic governance 
struggles to come to terms with the rise of a supranational ‘economic sovereign’ in the 
Eurozone. 
Keywords: neoliberalism, market discipline, liberal governmentality, European economic 
governance, Economic and Monetary Union, sovereign 
Introduction 
All the returns and revivals of nineteenth and twentieth century liberal and neo-
liberal thought are still a way of posing the problem of the impossibility of the 
existence of an economic sovereign. (Foucault 2008: 328.) 
 
After decades of strenuous balancing between globalist aspirations for greater market freedoms 
and domestic sensitivities for protecting industries, workers and welfare states, European 
economic governance took a decisive neoliberal turn in the 1980s (van Apeldoorn 2009). With 
the unshackling of capital movements and agreements on the single market and common 
currency a new governing regime and rationality gradually became entrenched, identified by 
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Stephen Gill (1995; 1998) as ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’. An integral part of this new regime 
was the market’s promotion as a governance mechanism of economic activities at the expense 
of the state’s intervening and planning capacities (Fraser 2003). That was also the case with 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the stability of which was designed to rest not only 
on supranational rule enforcement ensuring that the users of the shared currency would commit 
to sound economic management, but also on the disciplinary power of the market over national 
fiscal and economic policies (European Commission 1990). 
Any illusions about market-based stability ended with the disastrous market failures of 
2007–2008 and the subsequent euro crisis. Nevertheless, as an indication of the market’s firm 
rootedness in Europe’s governing discourse and rationality, the principle of market discipline 
continues to feature in policy debates over governing the Eurozone and reforming its 
institutional framework. A variety of proposals, from automatic debt restructuring and 
sovereign concentration charges to ‘safe assets’ and ‘junior sovereign bonds’, have seen the 
light in recent years, all driven by the sometimes explicit but often implicit goal of 
strengthening the market discipline for member state governments (e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
2018). While primarily promoted by the conservative and market-liberal camps of European 
politics (see Pühringer 2015; EPP 2017), market discipline appeals to policymakers across the 
political spectrum (Rommerskirchen 2019: 128) and has sometimes found surprising advocates 
even among the radical left (e.g. Varoufakis 2019). 
How should we make sense of the market’s persistent appeal in European economic 
governance despite its evident destabilising tendencies? Over the past decade the economic 
crisis has given rise to a wide-ranging and multidisciplinary effort to analyse the EMU and its 
current predicaments in terms of neoliberalism and ordoliberalism (e.g. Schmidt and Thatcher 
2014; Streeck 2015; Ryner 2015; Bonefeld 2017; Cardwell and Snaith 2018; Hien and Joerges 
2018).1 The present article subscribes to the underlying argument in this literature that to 
understand Eurozone’s current predicament, it is useful to appreciate how EMU’s institutions 
and policies have been influenced by neoliberalism and to explore its contradictory nature as 
an intellectual and political project. Conversely, examining the current problems in European 
economic governance and efforts to deal with them can give us valuable insight into the 
changes within neoliberalism as a dominant governing regime and rationality. In the hope of 
contributing to these debates this article focuses on a topic that has hitherto received less 
attention: the promotion of the government bond market as a mechanism to discipline 
Eurozone’s member states. Accordingly, I argue that the contemporary calls for more market 
discipline illustrate continuing efforts to harness the market to direct government conduct, 
which is characteristic of neoliberalism as a governing regime and rationality. Yet these efforts 
are riddled with difficulties and contradictions.2 
In this regard I draw attention to what Foucault (2008) and more recently Vogl (2017) 
have identified as ‘the problem of the economic sovereign’ in liberal economic governance, 
meaning the inability of liberal thought to recognise and come to terms with a political power 
capable of exerting its authority in the realm of the economy. On the basis of this insight my 
aim is to demonstrate how enforcing market discipline through government bond markets has 
become increasingly complicated since extensive market interventions in the euro crisis by the 
EU’s supranational state apparatus, and the European Central Bank (ECB) in particular. This 
is because market discipline as a bilateral relationship between a government and its creditors 
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can function properly only when neither party can rely on an authority to bail them out. The 
principle of market discipline is thus antithetical to the presence of an interventionist 
supranational economic sovereign, which is exactly what the Eurozone has witnessed since the 
beginning of the euro crisis. In one way or another current market-disciplinary reform 
proposals seek to address this problem by ‘doing away’ with Eurozone’s economic sovereign; 
yet they struggle to come to terms with the ECB’s deep involvement in government bond 
markets. Ultimately, the difficulties in producing market discipline in the EMU reflect tensions 
within disciplinary neoliberalism concerning the exercise of economic sovereignty over the 
market. 
The argument proceeds as follows. The next section briefly outlines how the market 
has been rationalised in neoliberal thought as a governance mechanism, specifically addressing 
the problem this raises regarding the (im)possibility of an economic sovereign. It is followed 
by a critical account of (i) how the conditions of market discipline were affected in Europe by 
the establishment of the common currency and the simultaneous creation of a supranational 
economic sovereign; (ii) how the supranational political authorities further undermined these 
conditions in the euro crisis; (iii) how market discipline has resurfaced on Eurozone’s policy 
agenda in recent years as a response to the apparent lack of fiscal discipline; and (iv) how the 
promotion of market discipline is premised on the weakening of the economic sovereign but 
faces multiple obstacles in Europe’s post-crisis context. The article concludes with a discussion 
of how strengthening supranational political authority in the euro crisis reflects disciplinary 
neoliberalism’s ‘authoritarian turn’, undermining the credibility of market discipline as an 
autonomous and apolitical mechanism of governance in the Eurozone. 
The Market as Governance Mechanism of States and the Problem of the Sovereign 
In the context of sovereign bond markets, market discipline may be broadly defined 
as the influence that market participants exert on governments by pricing different 
risks of default. [...] In differentiating between interest rates according to the degree 
of fiscal prudence shown by a country, markets financially ‘punish’ and ‘reward’ 
governments. Consequently, governments have to take into account these higher 
financing costs when planning their fiscal policies. Market discipline therefore 
serves as a deterrent against unsound fiscal policies, and in turn supports fiscal 
discipline. (González-Páramo 2006.) 
 
The promotion of the market as the principal driving force of economic processes has always 
distinguished neoliberalism as a governing regime and rationality (Plehwe 2009; Mirowski 
2013; Slobodian 2018). Firstly, by theorising the market as a site of verification, capable of 
revealing the ‘true’ worth of economic pursuits through the price signal, neoliberal thought 
reaffirms the classical liberal argument that an economy governed by a competitive market 
achieves what political authority cannot: the coordination of economic activities for the general 
good of society (Jackson 2012). Declaring the universal benefits of a ‘free’ market, 
neoliberalism prohibits undue state intervention. Secondly, the operation of the market as a site 
of verification is not limited to private actors. As investors, producers and consumers react to 
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government activities, the market can just as well determine the conduct of good and legitimate 
government. Accordingly, in the neoliberal rationality of government, the state is to be 
supervised by the market rather than vice versa (Foucault 2008). Like any other actor in the 
economy, the state must subject itself to price signals. Market competition thus appears as a 
principle ‘not only for limiting governmental intervention, but also rationalising government 
itself’ (Burchell 1991: 23). 
In neoliberal reasoning, the international dimension plays an important role in securing 
the market’s rule over economies. Since democratic governments are always vulnerable to 
popular pressures to intervene in the market-based allocation of resources (see e.g. Hayek 
1986), the market operates as a governance mechanism at its best only in conditions where it 
can discipline states, limiting their capacity to intervene. To create such conditions it is 
necessary to promote the liberalisation of markets (Sally 2002; Spieker 2014). Through 
successful liberalisation any centralised allocation of resources becomes self-defeating as ‘the 
free flow of goods and investment […] discipline[s] economies away from intervention and 
planning’ (Slobodian 2018: 102).  
Nevertheless, their intellectual attraction to federalism as a form of governance and 
keen involvement in shaping and running international agencies indicates that the neoliberals 
never dismissed the importance of political institutions (Slobodian 2018). Positioning itself 
against simplistic (‘laissez-faire’) conceptions of the market as a natural or spontaneous 
phenomenon, neoliberal reasoning emphasises the need for a strong political authority to 
establish the market’s very conditions of existence through laws, rules and regulations (Dale 
2019; Stahl 2019). As discussed by Foucault (2008) and Vogl (2017), a dilemma thus appears 
in liberal thought concerning political authority and its rule over the economy. In political terms 
there is to be strong, sovereign and preferably supranational institutions to uphold the market-
based order. In economic terms, in contrast, it is possible to neither identify nor create an 
authority with sovereign powers over the market. In liberal governmental reason ‘there is no 
economic sovereign’ (Foucault 2008: 283).  
The failure to recognise an economic sovereign in theory and practice creates constant 
problems for the neoliberal governing rationality. Foucault (2008) noted that the capacity of 
the market alone to govern the economy always remained suspect and reoccurring problems in 
the economy kept bringing back the question of the sovereign—its possibility, necessity and 
even inevitability. As Vogl (2017: 37) puts it: ‘Although liberalism evacuates the post of the 
sovereign through its appeal to the market, it fails to get rid of the problem of sovereignty’.  
In Europe, the failure of the liberal forms of governance to come to terms with the idea 
and practice of economic sovereignty has had far-reaching consequences for market discipline. 
The following section discusses how the EMU gave rise to the problem of the sovereign and 
how that problem has become acute in the wake of the euro crisis, which saw EU institutions 
in general and the European Central Bank (ECB) in particular exercising their supranational 
authority over the market. As a result, while attempts to strengthen the government bond 
market as a fiscal-disciplinary mechanism are ongoing in the Eurozone, the very possibility 
and credibility of market discipline is undermined by the continuing need for an interventionist 
economic sovereign. 
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The Quest for Market Discipline in European Economic Governance 
The Market-disciplinary Eurozone and the Creation of a Supranational Economic 
Sovereign 
As the 1980s accorded new dominance to ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ as an international 
governing regime in Europe (Gill 1995; 1998), the market grew in importance both as a 
mechanism and rationality of governance. The harmonisation of regulations and the 
liberalisation of cross-border factor movements promoted European market integration within 
the framework of which EEC member states now competed for investments. The commitment 
of governments to low inflation and exchange rate stability in the European Monetary System 
(EMS) further diminished their capacity to practise policies that ran against market preferences. 
These developments were given a sense of inevitability by a political, public and academic 
discourse of ‘globalisation’ that emphasised how states had become subordinate to the will of 
the market (Cameron and Palan 2004; Rosenberg 2005). Investors and creditors were expected 
to discipline political authorities, who in turn were to internalise the demands of this Marktvolk 
(Streeck 2014). 
The influence of such market-oriented reasoning was also apparent in the construction 
of the Eurozone, not least due to the influence of ordoliberalism on the German positions 
regarding the institutional structure of the EMU (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). EMU’s 
architects saw that when sovereign countries tied themselves into a single currency without 
simultaneously creating a central fiscal policy authority, there would have to be strong 
incentives for national governments to enact the convergent economic and fiscal policies on 
which the currency’s stability depended. In addition to binding rules limiting government 
deficits and debt, the government bond market would have to play a crucial part, exerting the 
needed ‘disciplinary influence’ on the member states (Delors 1989: 20). The market’s role was 
subsequently given official status in the Maastricht Treaty. By designating long-term interest 
rates as one of the euro convergence criteria, the treaty enlisted creditors to evaluate whether 
or not a member state was fit to join the currency union. 
However, even as the EMU was intended to rely on the government bond markets as 
discipliners of its members, its effects on the strength and nature of that discipline were 
complex. Whereas the combination of the single market’s ‘four freedoms’ with the EMS had 
rendered governments highly vulnerable to market speculation and limited their room for fiscal 
and monetary policy manoeuvre (Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Brunnermeier et al. 2016), the 
creation of a common currency altered the state-market relationship. Even though the 
governments that adopted the euro became users of a ‘foreign’ currency in increasingly 
integrated financial markets, making them even more exposed to lenders’ preferences, the 
EMU would also alter those preferences by removing the currency risk. As a result, joining the 
Eurozone gave member states some protection from market pressures (also see 
Rommerskirchen 2019: 122–5). 
Moreover, the monetary union established the ECB as a new supranational authority 
with sovereign powers over the currency. If market discipline is typically understood as a 
bilateral relationship of interaction between a state and its creditors—and analysed as such by 
economists and political scientists (e.g. Dewachter and Toffano 2012; McMenamin et al. 2015; 
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Rommerskirchen 2015)—the EMU added a third party to this relationship, inevitably altering 
its nature and operation. Not only did the ECB shape the context of that interaction by its mere 
existence, it also had the capacity to intervene in ways that either strengthened or weakened 
the market’s disciplinary hold on governments. How would it use those powers, and would it 
be able to resist political pressures to protect a member state that came under a speculative 
attack from creditors? Designing the ECB to be ‘the most independent central bank in the 
world’ (Papadia and Ruggiero 1999: 64) and prohibiting it from financing government debt in 
the Maastricht Treaty represented attempts to shield the ECB from such pressures. Yet it was 
precisely over concerns of this kind that many neoliberal intellectuals, while advocating 
European economic integration toward a single liberalised market, were sceptical about the 
establishment of a currency union (Slobodian 2018). 
As it turned out the ECB proved unable to resist the temptation of using its discretionary 
competences very long. In 2005, after the member states failed to impose sanctions on France 
and Germany for fiscal rules violations, the ECB announced changes to its policy concerning 
collateral requirements (see Orphanides 2017). In an attempt to compensate for what it saw as 
the erosion of the rule-based fiscal discipline with the strengthening of market discipline, the 
ECB signalled that it would not automatically accept government bonds as collateral when 
lending to private financial institutions. Instead, the bonds would be eligible only at a minimum 
credit-rating threshold (A-). While the move had little immediate impact, it demonstrated the 
ECB’s readiness to intervene in the government-creditor relationship. As the crisis unfolded a 
few years later, adjusting the collateral criteria became a repeatedly used means for the ECB 
to manage market reactions and discipline member states. 
Market Discipline in Crisis 
The euro crisis, together with the North Atlantic financial crisis, brought the ‘emergency 
powers’ of Eurozone’s supranational authorities into plain view (Vogl 2017: 9). The European 
Council and the EU Commission responded to the escalating market dysfunction with bailouts 
of commercial banks and governments, establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
as a new Eurozone authority to arrange these bailouts. The ECB simultaneously engaged in a 
series of market interventions, including secondary government bond markets under the 
Securities Market Programme (SMP). In 2012, following Mario Draghi’s pledge that the ECB 
would do ‘whatever it takes’ to preserve the euro, the central bank eased creditors’ uncertainty 
by announcing the Outright Monetary Transactions Programme (OMT) (Bastasin 2015: 394–
5). The OMT committed the ECB to unlimited support of any Eurozone government that 
applied for financial assistance.  
Protecting private investors from losses once they endangered the survival of the euro, 
the combined effect of these measures was to undermine market discipline in both practice and 
principle. First, EU institutions addressed widespread uncertainty in the financial sector by 
creating mechanisms that were to convince creditors that member states were not at risk of 
insolvency. They thus signalled that the debt of even the most distressed governments ought to 
be regarded as a ‘safe’ investment. The status of being safe, however, significantly weakened 
market discipline, the functioning of which requires that creditors face at least a potential risk 
when lending to a government. Second, Eurozone’s market discipline had been based on rules 
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and conventions intended to guarantee that the ECB and the Council as the bloc’s supranational 
political authorities would not intervene in the creditor-government relationship; however, this 
principle was repeatedly violated during the crisis because of the necessity of protecting 
vulnerable governments from speculative attacks. Rather than subjecting themselves to market 
signals, the authorities imposed their sovereign powers over the market.  
It should be noted that while the underlying conditions of and assumptions about market 
discipline were seriously undermined by the imposition of supranational political authority 
over creditors, the euro crisis did little to weaken disciplinary neoliberalism as a dominant 
governing regime. Instead of relying on the market as an autonomous disciplining mechanism, 
European authorities now enforced fiscal discipline through other institutions, including 
Memorandums of Understanding, the Troika and the European Semester, which brought 
national budgets under the Commission’s surveillance and the Council’s coordination. 
Moreover, the ECB repeatedly took advantage of its control over the government bond market 
to either directly or indirectly pressure governments into greater austerity and structural 
reforms (Bastasin 2015; Woodruff 2016). Such a blatant use of the market as a policy tool to 
subject governments to the will of the central bank rendered the ECB’s power over the bloc 
increasingly apparent—and  politicised (Högenauer 2019; Tortola 2019).  
These new directions, sometimes claimed to be representing an ‘authoritarian’ turn in 
Europe’s neoliberal economic governance (e.g. Streeck 2015; Bonefeld 2017; Wilkinson 2019; 
see also Schneider and Sandbeck 2018), can be interpreted as an implicit acknowledgment by 
Eurozone’s governing elites that fiscal discipline had failed to result ‘naturally’ from the 
operation of market mechanisms and now required stronger legal constraints and outright 
political coercion. Indeed, one of the principal narratives that emerged about the crisis pointed 
to the market’s failure as a disciplinary mechanism (Rommerskirchen 2015). The argument 
was granted formal recognition by EU institutions in 2015. In an ‘analytical note’ that served 
as the basis for the revamped Eurozone reform agenda, EU leaders identified the euro crisis as 
‘the crisis of markets in terms of their capacity to price country risk correctly’ (Juncker 2015: 
4). 
Resurgence of Market Discipline 
Despite its apparent failure as Eurozone’s governance mechanism, the market’s role in 
ensuring fiscal discipline was never entirely discounted. It still had powerful advocates around 
Europe, particularly in the bloc’s export-oriented countries led by Germany (Hacker and Koch 
2017). Generally reluctant to bail out insolvent member states and often sceptical about the 
ECB’s rescue measures, many politicians and economists in these countries warned about the 
long-term consequences of such policies in terms of moral hazard and loss of discipline (e.g. 
Schäuble 2011; Sinn 2014). Their reasoning was that until political integration reached a point 
where authority over fiscal policies was effectively delegated to supranational institutions, the 
market would need to serve as a disciplinary mechanism in Eurozone’s governance. 
How was such a conviction possible in the post-crisis context, in which many expert 
and even official accounts criticised financial markets for their destabilising effects? Such 
accounts, after all, not only questioned the market’s feasibility as a governing mechanism, but 
also suggested a more fundamental rethink of the policies of liberalising capital flows in the 
Markus Ojala – Doing Away with the Sovereign 
8 
 
absence of supranational fiscal capacities to mitigate the unwanted effects of those flows (e.g. 
Mitchell and Fazi 2017). The answer arguably lies in a neoliberal governing rationality that 
rejected the post-crisis scepticism of the market and focused instead on the deficiencies in its 
institutional operating framework. 
According to this line of reasoning, the failure of private creditors to discipline 
Eurozone governments prior to the crisis followed from their appreciation of euro-denominated 
bonds as essentially risk-free investments. However, instead of demonstrating the market’s 
incapacity to price risks correctly, the creditors’ lenience pointed to deficiencies in European 
regulations that created inappropriate incentives for market agents, as well as to the lack of 
credibility of EMU’s no-bailout clause (e.g. Mayer 2012; Sinn 2014). Even if it had been 
ratified in the treaties, creditors assumed that, come the crisis, the prohibition would not be 
heeded. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, it was now possible to argue that the market had 
anticipated the bailouts all along (Feld et al. 2016). Consequently, the correct solution for the 
Eurozone was not to abandon the market as a governance mechanism but to improve the EMU 
rules and regulations so that creditors would no longer be tempted to second-guess European 
governments and institutions. Once the threat of losses was truly appreciated by creditors, the 
market would produce proper signals for member states and help prevent a build-up of 
unsustainable deficits and debt. 
The so-called Deauville proposal represented an early attempt to (re)introduce market 
discipline into crisis management and prevention. Agreed in bilateral talks between Chancellor 
Merkel and President Sarkozy in October 2010, it proposed that private creditors would face 
losses in any future bailout through the ESM (Bastasin 2015: 463). However, as the vocal 
opponents of the deal, including ECB’s Jean Claude Trichet, claimed that the threat of 
automatic ‘haircuts’ was spooking creditors and intensifying the debt crisis, Merkel backed off 
and the idea of automatic private sector involvement was eventually watered down and 
effectively abandoned (Mody 2018: 275–9). Still, when the EU and IMF extended a loan to the 
Cypriot government in 2013 to deal with the country’s banking crisis, the bailout was 
accompanied by a levy on investors and large depositors (Bastasin 2015: 435–6). These 
episodes demonstrated that, far from sentencing market-based governance into oblivion, the 
euro crisis provoked a renewed contestation about it. 
As the 2010s progressed the case for reinvigorating market discipline gradually gained 
traction. For one, it became increasingly apparent that the capacity of the revamped fiscal 
coordination and rule framework to sanction governments was limited (see Rommerskirchen 
2019). Noting that the member states continued to violate deficit rules and miss debt reduction 
targets without facing penalties, the proponents of fiscal discipline could not but conclude that 
the Commission-led monitoring and coordination of fiscal policies was too weak to lift the 
Eurozone out of its debt predicament. As a leading German ordoliberal Hans-Werner Sinn 
(2014: 6) reasoned: ‘While soft budget constraints help in the short run and reduce the 
probability of a collapse of the system, they remove the incentives to tackle the structural 
reforms that would cure the disease’.  
Such regrets were compounded after the ECB launched an aggressive asset purchase 
program in 2015 to prevent a deflationary spiral. The side effect of ECB’s quantitative easing 
was to limit the divergence of member states’ borrowing costs and could thus be seen as further 
alleviating the pressure on governments to implement larger spending cuts and reforms to 
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improve price competitiveness. The demand grew for new means to incentivise highly indebted 
countries ‘to put their houses in order’. Instead of tougher rules, surveillance and sanctions the 
focus now turned to reforms that would strengthen the disciplinary effects of markets over 
Eurozone governments. Accordingly, a variety of proposals from automatic debt restructuring 
and ‘sovereign concentration charges’ to ‘sovereign bond-backed securities’ (SBBS) and 
‘junior sovereign bonds’ have seen the light in recent years, all driven by the sometimes explicit 
but often implicit goal of tightening the borrowing conditions of highly indebted member states 
(e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018; Deslandes et al. 2018; Eidam and Heinemann 2019; Fuest and 
Heinemann 2017; Véron 2017). 
The Problem of the Sovereign 
The Eurozone’s institutional arrangements combined with long-term developments in the 
financial markets place various obstacles to strengthening the market’s disciplinary grip over 
member states. For one, government bonds have come to serve an increasingly central function 
as collateral when banks and other financial institutions lend to each other in the wholesale 
financial markets (Gabor and Ban 2016). This functional importance of bonds means that there 
is a constant market demand for public debt, which tends to undermine the fiscal-disciplinary 
pressures that creditors impose on governments outside the circumstances of an acute financial 
crisis. 
To fulfil their role as collateral, government bonds must be perceived as highly reliable, 
or ‘safe’, assets. Indeed, during the euro crisis EU authorities protected the status of bonds as 
safe assets to secure the operation of interbank lending. For its part, by continuing to accept 
bonds as collateral and using them to conduct monetary policy (Braun and Gabor 2019), the 
ECB also contributes to making them safe. All this runs counter to the very logic of market 
discipline based on the principle of creditor risk. Therefore, all current reform proposals 
intended to strengthen market discipline seek to address this problem in one way or another. 
For instance, to compensate for the establishment of the ESM as a permanent government 
bailout mechanism, proposals on automatic debt restructuring aim to impose losses on 
investors whenever a member state applies to an ESM programme (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018; 
Eidam and Heinemann 2019). The regulatory initiative on SBBS, for its part, would allow the 
private sector to introduce a new class of bond-backed securities that would operate as ‘safe 
assets’ while demoting the debt issued by highly-indebted countries to a lower status 
(Deslandes et al. 2018).  
It thus appears that the current market-disciplinary reforms are meant to reinforce 
investor uncertainty regarding government bonds without completely destroying the 
arrangements put in place to gain that certainty. The difficulty of attending to the needs of 
financial markets while enforcing fiscal discipline thus tends to lead to rather confounding 
reasoning about government bonds that must simultaneously be seen both as safe and unsafe, 
or in the words of ECB’s Benoit Cœuré (2016), as safe but not ‘too safe’: 
 
We need public debt to be safe in the euro area. […] Yet at the same time, we also 
do not want public debt to be perceived as too safe, since that would eliminate the 
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role of market discipline in delivering sustainable policies and create a false belief 
that governments cannot fail. (Cœuré 2016, original emphasis.) 
 
Promoting uncertainty and ambiguity about the status of government bonds is certainly an 
essential precondition for market discipline; yet its main obstacle in the post-crisis context may 
well be the ECB itself. For even as the Maastricht Treaty’s provisions were meant to limit its 
scope of discretion, they failed to prevent the ECB from exercising its sovereign powers over 
the currency to keep governments solvent and fulfil the market’s acute need for liquidity.  
The rationale for strengthening market discipline rests on the conviction that subjecting 
governments to the threat of an investor run will lead to a more stable currency union: ‘the risk 
of insolvency […] is the stabilising principle that holds everything together’ (Sinn 2014: 358). 
According to this logic stability is finally achieved when all economic actors are convinced 
that there is no one to rescue them if they run into trouble. This is why members of the German 
Council of Economic Experts reason that the ECB’s current role as the ultimate guarantor of 
government debt ‘can hardly be considered a sustainable situation’ and so the goal must be to 
‘relieve the ECB of its role as a crisis manager’ (Feld et al. 2016: 53). Against the growing 
dependence of the Eurozone economy on the ECB they strive to limit its powers and 
responsibilities. The ultimate precondition of market discipline is to maintain the euro as a 
‘sovereign-less currency’ (Bénassy-Quéré 2016)—or at least a general perception of it as such. 
In this sense the current search for stronger market discipline in the Eurozone has clear 
affinities with the neoliberal project that seeks to circumscribe, restrict and even ‘annihilate’ 
the sovereign both in governing theory and practice (Dean 2007: 186). The neoliberal argument 
posits that for the market to work as governing mechanism no actor can be clearly identified 
as an economic sovereign or lender of last resort capable of standing above and disciplining 
the market. And if there is such a sovereign, as in the case of a supranational monetary 
authority, all market participants including governments must live in constant uncertainty about 
its willingness to rescue them; to act as if there is no sovereign. As Dean (2007: 191) argues, 
the neoliberal rationality can make sense of sovereign power only in terms of a state of 
exception, as a temporary suspension of law and the normal running of things. There is no 
place for such political authority in a state of normalcy, which is to be governed by the market. 
The problem European economic governance now faces is whether a vision of a 
sovereign-less currency is credible or viable any longer in Eurozone’s post-crisis context. In 
its business of saving the euro the ECB not only protected member states from market 
speculation but also enhanced their fiscal room for manoeuvre, becoming deeply involved in 
government bond markets in ways that are all difficult to undo, at least in the short term. As a 
result the ECB has effectively turned into Eurozone’s ‘government of last resort’ (Vogl 2017: 
121), inevitably shaping the very nature of market discipline as a governance mechanism. From 
a social relationship that was based on the bilateral interaction between a government and its 
creditors market discipline has increasingly turned into a device administered by the ECB as 
the overseer of both governments and the market. To erase the supranational economic 
sovereign from the equation it would have to be disassociated once and for all from the 
government debt market, effecting a transformational shift in how financial markets operate in 
today’s ‘central bank-led capitalism’ (Bowman et al. 2013). 




For the neoliberal rationality the euro crisis was never a reason to reconsider the viability of 
the market as a principle and practice of governance in the Eurozone. Far from invalidating the 
market as a governance mechanism its flaws provide the government its raison d'être: one of 
neoliberalism’s central insights, after all, is that the functioning of the market can always be 
improved by reforming its operational framework (Jackson 2012; Woodruff 2016; Stahl 2019). 
The question is not how to insulate economic policy as much as possible from market pressures. 
It is rather how to reform the institutions and rules in a way that improves the mutual 
responsiveness of governments and other market agents to secure prudence, predictability and 
stability. Crises expose the deficiencies in the framework and help identify the ways in which 
it must be tweaked. 
The problem that crises pose for the neoliberal governing rationality, therefore, is not 
so much the dysfunction of markets but the need for political authorities to tighten their grip 
on the economy and thus to demonstrate their power. For while the market’s disciplinary force 
was undermined in the euro crisis, political and bureaucratic discipline took over. National 
economies were steered toward the path of austerity and neoliberal reforms both gently, 
through the EU’s unique combination of administrative and peer pressure, and forcefully, 
through the notorious Memorandums of Understanding overseen by the Troika. While typically 
relying on an elite consensus over the necessity of such measures, Europe’s political and 
bureaucratic apparatus has not shied away from stamping its authority whenever an elected 
government put up resistance, as in the cases of Greece in 2015 and Italy in 2018. At crucial 
stages the ECB also stepped in, exploiting its stranglehold over Eurozone banks and 
governments to persuade the latter to endorse its policy prescriptions (Fontan 2018; Woodruff 
2016). 
That such disciplinary events have become a recurrent feature of Europe’s economic 
governance follows logically from attempts to tighten the administrative and political control 
over member states at a time of deep economic trouble and social dislocation. To paraphrase 
Gill (1995: 411), they represent the ‘particular instances of disciplinary power’ that 
complement the more structural forms of power in neoliberalism. Nevertheless, even as this 
regime as a whole has shown few signs of weakening, its need to resort to threats, dictates and 
outright coercion has made the power Eurozone’s supranational forms of political authority 
exert over member states increasingly apparent (Streeck 2015; Bonefeld 2017). The political 
backlash in the form of growing economic nationalism in its left and right versions indicates 
that the exposure of disciplinary neoliberalism’s ‘authoritarian’ features threatens its 
legitimacy everywhere in Europe. 
Perhaps more worryingly for the system’s neoliberal architects, the demonstrations of 
force risk turning the European institutions of economic governance into targets of growing 
societal demands and popular calls for action. This can be witnessed both in the drive for new 
supranational fiscal competences to address Eurozone’s lack of macroeconomic stabilisation 
capacities and in the public demands directed at the ECB. Indeed, even as it is shielded by 
statutes from any democratic accountability, the ECB is now subject to formidable political 
pressures to maintain easy credit conditions for member states, to protect systemically 
important financial institutions from insolvency, and even to address the continent’s needs for 
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employment and investments for a sustainable future (e.g. Stiglitz 2016; Moghadam 2018; 
Skolimowski 2019). 
Arguably then, the flipside of liberal economic governance having to resort to 
increasingly authoritarian forms of rule is the simultaneous loss of its depoliticised nature and 
appearance (Schmidt 2019; Tortola 2019). The current push by Europe’s ordoliberal and 
market-liberal policymakers for more market discipline can be viewed as an attempt to counter 
these tendencies. For them, strengthening the role of the market in directing national policies 
at the expense of EMU’s rule-based policy coordination promises to depoliticise economic 
governance and make it more palatable to governments and electorates. 
Charlotte Rommerskirchen (2019) has recently argued that resorting to the market as a 
disciplinary mechanism is a logical outcome of the member states’ unwillingness to commit to 
binding rule-based fiscal coordination. Market discipline can certainly be regarded as a sort of 
default mode in Eurozone governance, something to fall back on after failures to establish 
strong political and bureaucratic governance processes. Such an argument, however, overlooks 
the extent to which the very production of market discipline has become increasingly difficult 
in the Eurozone because of the growing reliance of financial markets on government bonds as 
‘safe’ assets. And even if regulatory and institutional reforms could succeed in raising the debt-
servicing costs of (weaker) member states, the expansion of the ECB’s competences and policy 
tools and its deep involvement in government bond markets leave little doubt that the market’s 
disciplinary function has become heavily dependent on the central bank’s decisions. In the 
post-crisis condition characterised by the growing responsibilities of central banks in the 
functioning of financial markets (Bowman et al. 2013), Eurozone’s economic sovereign cannot 
be forced back into oblivion easily. And when it can no longer be convincingly characterised 
as a relationship between a state and its creditors, market discipline has lost much of its 
credibility as an apolitical principle and practice of governance.  
The intellectual and political difficulties of coming to terms with the sovereign in 
European economic governance manifest themselves in the current political impasse over 
reforming the EMU. Since the euro crisis the neoliberal rationality of market-based governance 
has found itself increasingly at odds with Eurozone’s institutional reality, leading to an 
ideological disorientation and political conflict over the way forward (Brunnermeier et al. 
2016). Fiscal federalism is presented as a solution by those who acknowledge the limits of the 
market and emphasise its destabilising effects (e.g. De Grauwe 2013; Berger et al. 2019). Not 
before sufficient supranational capacities for macroeconomic stabilisation are in place can the 
ECB withdraw its support for the member states without endangering the survival of the 
currency union. According to this view a Eurozone fiscal sovereign is therefore a precondition 
for imposing more market discipline on member states.  
Moves towards a fiscal union, however, continue to be steadfastly opposed by those 
whose greatest fear is an economic sovereign that becomes subject to political pressures and 
threatens to destroy the operation of the market as a governing mechanism. Accordingly, 
current calls to strengthen market discipline represent efforts to thwart Eurozone’s seemingly 
inexorable slide into more centralised and blatantly political forms of rule. In trying to prevent 
the creation of new supranational authorities capable of responding to democratic demands, 
market-disciplinary reformers cling to the neoliberal illusion of a sovereign-less economy. 
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1 As political philosophies, neoliberalism and ordoliberalism both have their roots in the 
interwar period and, while emphasising different notions at times, they have many overlaps—
including the affirmation of the benefits of the market mechanism in governing societies (e.g. 
Plehwe 2009; Slobodian 2018; Dale 2019). In the EU/EMU context, policies of liberalisation, 
privatisation and austerity have often been analysed under the rubric of neoliberalism (e.g. van 
Apeldoorn 2009; Schmidt and Thatcher 2014), whereas the notion of ordoliberalism has 
inspired analyses of EMU’s fiscal rules, the model of the ECB and the influence of Germany’s 
economic model and stability culture on euro crisis policies and debates (e.g. Ryner 2015; 
Bonefeld 2017; Hien and Joerges 2018). In this article I favour the notion of ‘disciplinary 
neoliberalism’ coined by Gill (1995; 1998) to indicate that European economic governance is 
not isolated from broader international governing regimes and rationalities. 
2 This article focuses on government bond markets as an intended mechanism of market 
discipline and is thus not meant as an exhaustive account of the ways investors may have an 
impact on Eurozone governments’ economic policy or restrict their room for manoeuvre. It 
should also be noted that the specific idea examined here of ‘market discipline’ as a governing 
mechanism of states is related to but differs from the way the term is sometimes used to 
describe a more general principle behind well-functioning competitive markets; a demand that 
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